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Abstract
A realist view of the quantum world is given along the lines of
Werner Heisenberg’s Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics and set in contrast to that associated with John von Neumann by
Henry Stapp. This view is distinguished by, among other elements: i)
the notion of quantum potentia and its actualization which results in
classical recorded values of measured quantities, ii) the grounding of the
existence and chancy character of individual measurement events in the
plenitude principle as applied to the set of eigenvalues of observables on
the space of quantum states, and iii) the identification of the individuals
of the theory by a straightforward individuation principle.
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Henry Stapp, in honor of whom this paper is contributed, has advocated
a view of the quantum world [1] taking its lead from John von Neumann’s
treatment of measurement [2]. Both this view and a different one developed
along the lines offered by Werner Heisenberg, which I advocate, are discussed
here. In addition to Heisenberg’s actualization of potentia, my view includes
principles grounding the individuation of quantum objects and the chancy
nature of outcomes of measurements on them.
Stapp views the quantum world as fundamentally “psycho-physical”
([1], p. 10) as a consequence of a specific, de facto “choice of placement” by
von Neumann of the moveable Schnitt (cut) introduced by Heisenberg that, for
the purposes of prediction, analyzes the world via two different sorts of system:
a classically describable measuring one lying at a scale “above” Schnitt that
is directly experienceable, and a necessarily quantum-mechanically described
measured one lying “below” the Schnitt that is indirectly experienceable [3, 4].
Stapp argues that the quantum world is psycho-physical because “a person’s
immaterial conscious mind interacts with that person’s material brain” upon
measurement ([1], p. 7) at the Schnitt, considered a causal interface. I have
recently argued, by contrast, for a much different view based on a strict adher-
ence to Heisenberg’s 1935 prescription for the Schnitt as well as his mid-1950s
articulation [5] of the Copenhagen interpretation centering on the notion of
actualization of quantum potentia. My view is unambiguously realist, neither
depending on consciousness nor disallowing the description of objective reality.
It is one that should be natural for physicists because, typically, they are both
realist and aligned with the Copenhagen approach (cf. [7]) despite often heard
claims that the latter is anti-realist in various respects.
For Heisenberg, the observer/measuring apparatus (not necessarily in-
volving consciousness) lies above the Schnitt and can be considered to probe
the quantum system lying below; the quantum system cannot be visualized
but only indirectly described, via quantum states (except upon interaction,
when the manifestation of their properties are classically describable). The
freedom of the physicist to choose the placement of the Schnitt was shown
by Heisenberg as due to the linearity of the Schro¨dinger state evolution [4],
but he argued that the allowed range of placement of this cut is limited and
always made between physical systems. “The claim. . . that it is indifferent at
which location the cut between the parts of the system to be treated quantum
mechanically and the classical measuring devices should be drawn, should thus
be made more precise. . . this cut cannot be shifted arbitrarily in the direction
of the atomic system. Rather, there are physical systems—and all atomic
systems belong among these—that the classical concepts are unsuitable to de-
scribe, and whose behaviour can therefore be expressed correctly only in the
language of wavefunctions” (emphasis mine) [4].
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Nonetheless, according to Stapp, by virtue of the manner of application
of his Process 1 (associated with “state collapse”), von Neumann “places” the
Schnitt precisely “between” the brain the mind/ego of an observer, not in the
physical world but “at” a boundary that he calls the mind–brain connection.
He holds that, in accordance with von Neumann’s assumption of the psycho-
physical parallelism, a non-linear state change (the logically prior Process 1)
occurs “at this interface,” despite the fact that it is inexplicable by currently
known scientific laws. In my view, bringing mental elements into physics is
unnecessary because a minimally realist Copenhagenist approach suffices for
the prediction of observable events. Moreover, supplementing such a view
with Aristotelian causation during measurement, as Heisenberg does in his
Copenhagen interpretation, renders his approach conceptually superior.
The concern driving the placement of the Schnitt is an important one,
that of establishing a connection between human experience and physics, in
light of the apparent difficulty in providing a deterministic physical account
of measurement, the infamous quantum measurement problem. However, it
arises from the failure to place the Schnitt between systems in the world as
Heisenberg prescribed, i.e. before any conscious brain. If an entire chain of
entities interacting in measurement X, Y,. . . , in the environment of the system
of interest S and the measuring apparatus A, a good measurement would
involve all these becoming correlated and the corresponding fully quantum
state evolving according to the unitary, Schro¨dinger state evolution which




ci|si〉|ai〉|xi〉|yi〉 . . . , (1)
a superposition where {si}, {ai}, {xi}, {yi}, etc., are the Hilbert space eigen-
bases for S, A, X, Y,. . . possibly including a brain. Physically, when interpreted
as anything but a calculational tool, this produces an unresolved logical regress
in the closed system approach to finding a definite measurement outcome.
Again, however, a difficulty only arises from the unrestricted applica-
tion of the quantum formalism, a problem identified and engaged by Heisen-
berg already in 1935 ([3]) through his bipartite division of the physical world
via the Schnitt, precluding a superposition such as this, with one side consid-
ered describable classical mechanically and its complement being treated via
the quantum formalism. Heisenberg restricted the placement of the Schnitt
so as to avoid any measurement problem and noted that it can only be made
between symbols for systems lying within the physical world. Eq. 1 does not
correctly portray the world’s ontological structure: Heisenberg’s restriction of
the placement of the Schnitt in the physical realm clearly precludes its place-
ment “above” the brain. For him, any analysis of measurement treating both
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the entirety of the world from S up to and including the measuring appara-
tus and/or brains quantum mechanically already constitutes a misuse of the
calculus of theory (see quote above), the primary role of which is to predict
what can be observed directly. Moreover, Stapp introduces extraphysical fac-
tors. “In the quantum world the observing processes of acquiring empirical
knowledge must disturb, or perhaps even bring into existence, the values that
we observe. . . This non-materialistic action injects the mind of the observer as
a causal agent into realistically interpreted orthodox quantum mechanics. It
gives our minds an essentially dynamical role to play, and hence a natural and
rational reason for them to exist” [1], p. 9.
It is important to note here that, on the contemporary philosophical
conception of realism, the independence of the knowable world is what realism
amounts to; Heisenberg’s restriction of the location of the Schnitt similarly
preserves the objectivity of physics. The utility of the collection of statistical
correlations appearing in Eq. 1 is unchanged by the relocation of the cut
(which is made for the purpose of calculation) and the corresponding system
redesignation (and hence the referent of |Ψ〉) “upward” toward systems in the
classical realm, so long as one considers two fundamentally differing sorts of
system, S′ and the remainder of the world A′; S′ holistically subsumes any
previously considered quantum system S together with anything else below
the cut, and A′(=A+W) is the thereby newly chosen “apparatus plus the
rest of the world” (W) above the cut. Importantly, the apparatus side plays
no formal role in the (by nature, statistical) quantum mechanical predictions
about outcomes it subsequently displays. Heisenberg also warns that, “Of
course, the introduction of the observer must not be misunderstood to imply
that some kind of subjective features are to be brought into the description of
Nature. The observer has rather only the function of registering decisions, i.e.
processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is an
apparatus or a human being. . . It must also be pointed out that in this respect
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is in no way positivistic. For
whereas positivism is based on sensual perceptions of the observer as elements
of reality, the Copenhagen interpretation regards things and processes which
are describable in terms of classical concepts, i.e. the actual, as the foundation
of any physical interpretation” [5], p. 22, cf. e.g. [6].
Although Stapp agrees that definite measurement outcomes could occur
in macroscopic measuring devices having no consciousness without apprecia-
bly affecting the predictions of standard quantum mechanics, he argues that:
i) there is no empirical evidence for such state change events that are not as-
sociated with human consciousness, and ii) if they do take place, to be natural
they must have evolved by natural selection in a way associated with the ap-
pearance of human consciousness in the history of nature [1]. However, claim
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(i) is false, in the sense that there is no direct empirically evidence whatsoever
for any role for consciousness in measurement, though it might appear to be
the case if one were to mistake the acquisition of knowledge of a changed state
of affairs for a change in the state of affairs itself; cf. [10]. As for claim (ii),
it is purely speculative at this point. Following Heisenberg, I submit that it
is solely upon the physical interaction of the quantum system with the clas-
sically describable apparatus that actualization takes place, as an individual,
physically causal but non-deterministic chance event [11, 12], with the result
appearing in a classical record of the outcome independently of any conscious-
ness that might (or might not) become aware of it later. This provides an
explanation of the appearance of definite outcomes and involves a physical
Aristotelian casual element rather than a psycho-physical one.
Note also that whenever a Lu¨ders measurement of a quantity is repeated
on a system without its having meanwhile interacted with another portion of
the world the same value is found in the registered result, satisfying Einstein’s
criterion for the existence of an element of physical reality [13]. How, then,
are the quantum physical states related to the measurement results appearing
in the classical record? The answer to this question can be found already
in the first, 1930 edition of Quantum mechanics of Paul Dirac, who provided
such connection between physical experienceable properties of the traditional,
classical sort with quantum measurement outcomes [14]. “If a state ψr and an
observable α are such that, when an observation is made of the observable with
the system in this state the result is certain to be the number a, we assume
this information can be expressed by the equation
αψr = aψr (2)
Conversely, when an equation of this type is given we assume it has the phys-
ical meaning that a measurement of the observable α with the system in state
ψr will certainly give for result the number a or that the observable α has the
value a for the state ψr, to use a classical way of speaking which is permissi-
ble in this case” ([14], p. 30), that is, the Eigenvalue–Eigenvector (EE) link.
This manifestly interpretational rule provides a prescription for attributing
meaning to statements about the properties of quantum systems incorporat-
ing Einstein’s reality criterion [15] and allows the physicist to attribute state
assignments on the basis of empirical data.
In Heisenberg’s approach to the quantum formalism, the complex am-
plitudes {ci} of the state |ψ〉 =
∑
i |ψi〉 of a system, when squared, provide the
objective probabilities {pi} of its being found upon measurement to possess
the possible values of the corresponding properties [17]: The measured value
of a property becomes definite (actual) with probability pr, as opposed to in-
definite (potential) [5, 10, 11] upon a precise measurement providing outcome
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r by the measuring apparatus in conjunction with the remainder of the world
which, again, is macroscopic and classically describable (cf. [8]). Quantum
probability is the “graded possibility” of the occurrence of events, cf. [18];
Heisenberg emphasized that this fits naturally with Aristotle’s theory of cau-
sation: “. . . in modern physics the concept of possibility, that played such a
decisive role in Aristotle’s philosophy, has moved again into a central place”
([22], p. 298). Moreover, contrary to a widespread belief regarding Aristotle’s
theory of causation and explanation, no teleological (“final”) cause appears
in this case [11]. The associated non-deterministic change of state-vector evo-
lution occurs precisely with the intervention of the measuring apparatus and
the rest of the world as its proximate cause: There is not a lack of causation
upon these events, but rather Aristotelian chance causation not captured by
the fundamental quantum law of motion for closed systems which applies only
to systems not being measured [10, 11].
In any well performed measurement by a properly calibrated appara-
tus, some member from a set of possible values must occur (according to the
Plenitude principle, with the specific actual value appearing by chance from
among the possible (according to the Principle of indifference), namely, those
that are eigenvalues in Eq. 2 (according to the EE link) [12]. This neither
requires nor refers to mentality, brains, or knowledge: “the transition from the
‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ takes place as soon as the interaction between the
object and the measuring device, and thereby with the rest of the world, has
come into play; it is not connected with the act of registration of the result
in the mind of the observer” ([23], p. 54-55). After measurement, the once
again isolated quantum system “no longer contains features connected with
the observer’s knowledge. . . it is also completely abstract . . . and the represen-
tation becomes a part of the description of Nature only by being linked to the
question of how real or possible experiments will result” ([5], p. 26).
The objects of the quantum ontology may be circumscribed within the
Copenhagen approach via the Principle of identity of indiscernibles (PII) [18].
Principle of identity of indiscernibles (PII). “If, for every property
F , object x has F if and only if object y has F , then x is identical
to y.”
Because quantum objects have been shown to be fully described via their
state vectors [19], it motivates a specific form of individuation, the Quantum
principle of individuation (QPI) when applied in the context of the equivalence
classes of quantum state vectors, the rays [20, 24, 21].
(QPI) A system is an individual if and only if its state is entirely
specifiable by a ray in the Hilbert space associated with it.
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Finally, consider the relation of this objective, realist ontology to the
experimenter’s knowledge, in particular, in actualization: “it does not matter
whether the observer is an apparatus or a human being; but the registration,
i.e. the transition from the possible to the actual, is absolutely necessary here,
and cannot be omitted from the interpretation of the quantum theory” ([23],
p. 137; my emphasis). Upon attending to the registered result, any conscious
observer only learns that “a certain one among the various possibilities has
proved to be the real one” (my emphasis) [5, 10]. Although knowledge plays a
role in quantum mechanics in assigning the state of the individual system on
the basis of empirical data, physical reality itself is objective. “The criticism
of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory reflects an anxiety that,
with this interpretation, the concept of “objective reality” which forms the
basis of classical physics might be driven out of physics. As we have shown
here, this anxiety is groundless, since the ‘actual’ plays the same decisive
part in quantum theory as it does in classical physics” [5]. Moreover, this
interpretation has proven highly valuable to the advancement of physics [25].
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